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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Clayton Adams appeals from his convictions for one count of second
degree murder and one count of aggravated battery.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas
At about 5:00 or 6:00 on the evening of p arch 10, 2006, three friends,
Mikeal Campbell, James Nelson, and Stephen Maylin, drove with Nelson to the
Dutch Goose bar in Caldwell, where they drank alcohol until they met a friend of
Campbell's, Tyler Gorley, at about 7:30 or 8:00 p.m.' (Tr., p.61, L.2 - p.66, L.6;
p.67, L.24 - p.68, L.l; p.243, ~s.14-18.') Campbell, Gorley and Maylin stayed at
the bar until it closed at 1:00 a.m., buying rounds of drinks for each other, and
drinking beer and other alcoholic drinks during that time. (Tr., p.67, L.20 - p.69,
L.20.) Campbell and Maylin were drunk. (Tr., p.69, Ls.13-14; p.242, L.21 p.243, L.1.)
As Campbell, Gorley, and Maylin left the bar, Campbell saw an
acquaintance, Clayton Adams, standing under the bar patio, and Adams agreed
to first drive Maylin to his home nearby, drive to Meridian to buy some beer, and
then take Campbell and Gorley with him to a party. (Tr., p.69, L.23 - p.73, L.2;
p.114, Ls.9-17; p.112, Ls.3-24; p.248, Ls.2-4; p.290, L.12 - p.291, L.9.)

'

Stephen Maylin testified he and his roommate, James Nelson, arrived at the
Dutch Goose bar between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. (Tr., p.239, L.20 - p.240, L.9.)
The trial transcript (Volume Ill of IV) will be referred to as "Tr.," the sentencing
hearing transcript (Volume IV of IV) will be referred to as "Sent. Tr.," and the jury
selection transcript (Volume II of IV) will be referred to as "Jury Sel. Tr."

'

The three friends -- Maylin, Gorley, and Campbell -- got into the back seat
of Adams' compact 4-d00r car, with Campbell sitting behind the passenger's
seat, Gorley in the middle, and Maylin behind the driver's seat. (Tr., p.76, L.18 p.77, L.4; p.246, 1.9 - p.247, L.9.) Adams' friend, Sergio Madrigal, who was not
known by the others, sat in the front passenger's seat. (Tr., p.324, Ls.1-3.)
Adarns drove away from the Dutch Goose, and traveled down the NampaCaldwell Boulevard. (Tr., p.73, Ls.10-17.) According to Campbell's testimony,3
as Adams reached the intersection of the Boulevard and Linden Road, he
stopped the car a few seconds, and then, while the light was still red, he bolted
left onto Linden, despite not being in the left turn lane. (Tr., p.77, L.14

- p.78,

L.lO.) After turning onto Linden, Adams was "flying through everything," going
60 or 70 miles per hour. (Tr., p.78, L.22 - p.79, L.1.)
When Adams turned onto Linden, Adams told the three men in the back
seat that they had to give him $10 each for beer. (Tr., p.78, Ls.17-19; p.79, L.4 p.80, L.3; p.249, Ls.4-16.) The three men yelled at Adams that they did not have
any money and "weren't going to give him fucking shit, nobody was going to get
nothing." (Tr., p.80, Ls.6-9; p.249, Ls.20-21.) At that point, there was a lot of
commotion in the car, with the three young men in the back seat screaming for
Adams to pull the car over so they could walk, and Adams refusing to stop,
threatening he "had a fucking knife and a gun and that somebody was going to
get hurt if they didn't' give up money." (Tr., p.80, Ls.18-21; p.249, L.23 - p.250,
L.2.) As the three men were screaming at Adams to stop the car, and as Adams
Stephen Maylin testified that Adams did not run the stop-light at the Linden
intersection. (Tr., p.292, Ls.2-24.)

screamed for money, saying "he's going to hurt people, stab people," Adams
slammed on the car's brakes and came to a stop in the middle of Linden Road,
between Middleton and Midland roads.4 (Tr., p.81, L.24 - p.83, L.6; p.250, Ls.516.)
With the car stopped, the three men in the 'back seat were all screaming
"run," and Maylin got out of the car from the left rear door, and Campbell and
Gorley, who Campbell could feel pushing behind him, got out of the car from the
right rear door. (Tr., p.83, L.13 - p.84, L.1.) When Maylin was attempting to get
out of the car from his back seat, Adams got out of car from the driver's door,
opened Maylin's rear door, and struck Maylin on his left side as he was standing
up to get out of the car. (Tr., p.253, L.16 - 254, L.8.) Maylin, not realizing he had
been stabbed, doubled over, caught himself on the car, and ran away from the
scene and off the side of the road until he noticed he was having trouble
breathing. (Tr., p.254, L.9 - p.255, L.lO; p.273, Ls.2-13; p.275, L.26 - p.276, L.7.)
Maylin heard Campbell yelling his name, and when he ran back to the scene,
Campbell was on a cell phone talking to 911 and Gorley was lying in the road.
(Tr., p.255, L.13

- p.256, L.13.)

Maylin did not see Adams and Gorley fighting.

(Tr., p.257, L2 1-24; p.302, Ls.4-6.)
When Campbell got out of the car, he fled into a field, until he realized that
Gorley was not behind him anymore. (Tr., p.83, L.251 - p.84, L . l ; p.86, Ls.8-24;
p.141, L.6

- p.142, L.19.)

Campbell turned around and saw Adams and Gorley

fighting a short distance from the back of Adams' car, with both men swinging at
The front passenger, Sergio Madrigal, was not saying or doing anything during
this time. (Tr., p.82, Ls.8-12.)
3

each other, Adams appearing to throw body blows at Gorley, and Gorley
appearing to be "fighting over the top" of Adams. (Tr., p.87, L.?O - p.88, L.5;
p.143, Ls.11-19.) Campbell did not see any weapon. (Tr., p.88, Ls.9-10; p.142,
L.25 - p.143, L.I.)
Campbell ran back towards Adams, and picked up some rocks on the way
and threw them at Adams. (Tr., p.88, Ls.11-21.) Adams appeared to stumble,
and then got into his car, turned off his car's lights, and drove away rapidly
towards Meridian. (Tr., p.89, Ls.2-23.) Campbell held Gorley up under his arm
and told him they had to get out of there, whereupon Gorley said "wait," that he
needed to catch his breath, then fell over, pulling Campbell on top of him. (Tr.,
p.89, L.6 - p.90, L . l l . ) Campbell could feel blood coming from Gorley's chest,
and after pulling Gorley's jacket back and seeing a lot of blood, he began
screaming for Maylin to come back so he could use Maylin's cell phone to call
911

--

but then remembered Gorley had a cell phone, and retrieved it from

Gorley's pants pocket and made the 911 call himself. (Tr., p.90, L.14 - p.91, L.6.)
The 911 operator asked Campbell to go to a nearby residence to see what the
address was, which Campbell did after Maylin came back to the scene to stay
with Gorley. (Tr., p.94, L.8 - p.95, L.5.)
Minutes later, law enforcement officers arrived on the scene, followed by
paramedics.

(Tr., p.96, L.14 - p.97, L.2.)

According to Canyon County

Paramedic Jenifer Wyatt, who responded to the 91 1 call, Gorley was transported
to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center after Gorley's heart unexpectedly
began to show a heartbeat. (Tr., p.466, Ls.9-16; p.474, L.6 - p.475, L.11.) Wyatt

also testified that later that morning she transported a second stabbing victim
(Stephen Maylin, as identified by Wyatt through State's Exhibit 16) to a hospital,
and noted he had what appeared to be a stab wound about one inch wide that
went in deep under his left armpit, although he appeared to be stable. (Tr.,
p.476, L.4

- p.477, L.lO.)

Stephen Maylin did not realize he had been stabbed

until he removed his coat much later that morning while being interviewed at the
Canyon County Sheriff's Office; paramedics were summoned and he was
transported to the hospital. (Tr., p.259, L.9 - 263, L.2.)
Sergio Madrigal testified that he was Adams' friend, and he with Adams at
the Dutch Goose on the evening of March 10, 2006. (Tr., p.311, Ls.6-17; p.314,
L.7

- p.315, L.21.)

Madrigal affirmed that after closing time, he, Adams, and the

three men (whom he did not know), left in Adams' car to go to Meridian to buy
beer, then to go to a party.

(Tr., p.316, L.18

-

p.319, L.2; p.324, Ls.1-3.)

Madrigal recalled Adams asking the three men in the back seat for "like $3" to
buy beer, but did not hear the men's response because the radio was too loud.
(Tr., p.321, L.21

-

p.323, L.17.)

Adams got very mad, stopped the car by

screeching the tires, and told the three men in the back seat to "get the F out."
(Tr., p.322, Ls.6-14.) The three men got out of the car, but Madrigal did not see
what occurred outside, as he stayed in the vehicle. (Tr., p.323, L.6 - p.324,
L. 13.)
After sitting in the car a few minutes. Madrigal opened the door and saw
Adams coming back to the car, saying "let's go." (Tr., p.325, Ls.7-24; p.351,
Ls.2-5; p.352, Ls.3-8.) Adams got in the car and drove away fast, appearing to

be very mad, and told Madrigal pointedly that he thought he was his friend. (Tr.,
p.326, Ls.2-26.) As they drove away, Adams told Madrigal, "I think I stabbed
somebody," and then (when Madrigal did not believe him), "I think I did stab
somebody." (Tr., p.327, Ls.9-24.) Adams showed Madrigal his knife, and asked
him if he saw any blood on it. (Tr., p.328, Ls.1-3.) Madrigal looked at the knife a
little bit, but did not see any blood. Adams appeared very worried, and repeated
a couple of times, "you don't see no blood?" (Tr., p.328, L.24 - p.329, L.3.)
Adams told Madrigal not to tell "nobody" and to lie "to police or whoever said
something, not to say anything." (Tr., p.331, L.24 - p.332, L.8.) Madrigal was
afraid of Adams at that point because Adams was real upset, saying "nobody
fucks with me." (Tr., p.332, Ls.15-19.) Madrigal attempted to calm Adams down,
and the two drove to a Meridian convenience store and bought beer and
cigarettes.

( T I p.333, Ls.4-24.)

They then drove around Caldwell

unsuccessfully looking for the party they had heard about. (Tr., p.334, L.23 p.335, L.23.) Adams finally drove Madrigal to his (Adams') trailer house, and
when they pulled in, Adams was arrested and Madrigal was taken in for
questioning. (Tr., p.336, Ls.1-25.)
When Adams was arrested at his trailer, Canyon County Sheriffs
Sergeant Timothy Bowen found a knife in Adams' right from pocket, "a fold-up
clasp type knife with a clip on it, and it was clipped on to his front pants pocket."
(Tr., p.521, Ls.15-25.) A swab of that knife was tested for DNA analysis, and at
trial, Idaho State Police Forensic Sewices Lab forensic scientist Cynthia Hall

testified the DNA on the "knife blade swab matched Tyler Gorley." (Tr., p.649,
L.24 - p.650, L.1.)
The ER trauma surgeon at St. Alphonsus hospital that treated Tyler
Gorley was Dr. George Munayirji, M.D. (Tr., p.155, Ls.1-3; p.158, L.20 - p.?59,
L.5.) He testified Gorley appeared to be close to death when he arrived at the

ER, but after an ampule of epinephrine was given to him, a blood pressure was
produced, which caused the surgeon to take Gorley into the operating room to
examine his injuries in surgery.

(Tr., p.162, L.2

-

p.163, L.9.) Dr. Munayirji

determined during the surgery that it was not offering any help for Gorley, and
Gorley was given a CT scan to assist in determining the extent of his injuries,
which showed there was blood around Gorley's heart, and that he had already
suffered brain damage. (Tr., p.164, L.5 - p.165, L.5.) According to the surgeon,
he detected four stab wounds, the two most serious of which (1) penetrated the
liver and (2) "penetrated his pericardium, the sac that encloses the heart, and
caused the bleeding, and the blood was posing pressure on the heart." (Tr.,
p.164, Ls.3-4; p.165, Ls.10-16.) According to Dr. Munayirji, the stab wound to
the heart required a "good amount of force," and caused Gorely's life to expire at
the ER. (Tr., p.166, Ls.2-8; p.168, Ls.9-24.)
Dr. Glen Groben, the forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy on
Tyler Gorley's body, determined there were five stab wounds on Gorley's body,
one on the back of the upper left leg (that would have been easily missed by the

ER physicians), three wounds to the side of his chest (one of which cut through

Gorley's liver), and one wound toward the center of his chest5 (Tr., p.191, L.1 p.192, L.2; p.194, L . l l - 201, L.8.) Dr. Groben confirmed it was the stab wound
to Gorley's chest, which cut between his ribs and into the right ventricle of
Gorley's heart, that caused his death. (Tr., p.206, Ls.4-16; p.208, L.4

- p.209,

-

L.3; p.214, Ls.16-23; p.215, L.8 p.216, L.lO.)
The state charged Adams with first degree murder (or in the alternative
felony murder), aggravated battery, and three counts of attempted robbery. (R.,
pp.27-31.)

A jury convicted him after a trial of second degree murder and

aggravated battery. (R., pp.157-161.) The district court imposed a life sentence
with twenty-five years fixed for Adams' second degree murder conviction, and a
consecutive ten years with three years fixed for aggravated battery. (R., pp.172173.) Adams appeals. (R., 190-195.)

Two of the stab wounds to Gorley's side, and the wound to the back of his left
leg, although more than superficial in nature, were not potentially fatal. (Tr.,
p.209, L.4 - p.210, L.25; p.211, Ls.3-24.)

ISSUES
Adams states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court deny Mr. Adams his constitutional rights
1.
to a jury trial and to a fair trial when, after Juror 608 candidly
admitted she would hold any perceived withholding of information
against the defendant, the district court denied Mr. Adams the
ability to get an unequivocal assurance from Juror 608 that she
would not hold such a withholding of information against Mr. Adams
and when the district court failed to remove the juror?
Did the prosecutor violate Mr. Adams' due process right to a
2.
fair trial by committing misconduct in appealing to the passions and
prejudices of the jury by asking them to provide 'Tustice" to the
alleged victims and "justice" to Mr. Adams?
Does the combination of the above errors, even if
individually harmless, require reversal of Mr. Adams' convictions
under the doctrine of cumulative error?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by executing an
4.
excessive upon Mr. Adams in light of his young age, the role
alcohol played in the instant offense and his desire for treatment,
the support he enjoys from his family and friends, and his remorse?
(Appellant's brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Adams failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the trial
1.
court erred by not spontaneously striking juror 608? Additionally, has Adams
failed to demonstrate that the district court committed prejudicial error by failing
to spontaneously strike juror 608 for bias?
Has Adams failed to show he is entitled to relief on his prosecutorial
2.
misconduct claim?
Has Adams failed to establish that any error which may have occurred
during his trial is reversible under the cumulative error doctrine?

3.

Has Adams failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
4.
when it imposed a life sentence with 25 years fixed upon his conviction for
second degree murder, and a consecutive ten year sentence with three years
fixed for aggravated battery?

ARGUMENT
1.
Adams' Claim That The Trial Court Erred B y Not Spontaneously
Striking Juror 608 Is Not Preserved For Appellate Review; Further.
Adams Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed
Preiudicial Error By Failinq To S~ontaneouslyStrike Juror 608
A.

Introduction
During the jury selection voir dire by the state, juror 608 related she had

previously served on an Ada County jury in a drug case, and did not care for the
experience. (Jury Sei. Tr., p.248, L.18 - p.249, L.9.) When asked to expound
further, the following exchange occurred:
JUROR NO. 608: 1 was disappointed. At the end, the prosecutor
said if you have any questions, you know, stay in the room and
we'll come in and answer. And I didn't like that, as jurors, we
weren't given what I thought was all of the information, you know,
that the courts are very selective about what jurors can hear. It's
like we want you to sit up there, we want you to rule or do whatever
it is you do, but we're only going to give you this little piece, and
then you have to make you decision with that. I wanted -- the
things that he told us afterwards about the case that he could not
present, I didn't understand the reasons why they couldn't, so I
didn't care for that.
[Prosecutor]: I understand.
happened after the trial?

Okay. So you mentioned this

JUROR NO. 608: Correct.
[Prosecutor]: During the trial, did you get the feeling there were
things you weren't being told?
JUROR NO. 608: Yes, I didn't like having to -- it was like every
three minutes a word would be mentioned, and it's, oh, juror [sic],
leave, come back in five minutes, three minutes. Later a word is
mentioned. Oh, jury's got to leave. It was like, you know, either
stop saying the word or tell us what you're not telling us.
[Prosecutor]: You felt like a lab rat up there?

JUROR NO. 608: Yeah.
[Prosecutor]: Some type of controlled experiment?
JUROR NO. 608: Yeah
[Prosecutor]: Okay. Were the questions that were asked after the
trial answered to your satisfaction?
JUROR NO. 608: Yeah
(Jury Sei. Tr., p.249, L.11 - p.250, L.23.)
When the defense attorney subsequently questioned juror 608, she
reaffirmed her unhappiness about her prior juror experience in Ada County, and
defense counsel informed her there might be occasions where they "might have
to take up some legal issues" outside the presence of the jury. (Jury Sel. Tr.,
p.312, L.2 - p.313, L.15.) The discourse continued:
[Defense counsel]: That we might have to excuse the jury. Will
you promise me that you will not hold that against either myself or
the State if that happens in this case?
JUROR NO. 608: Do I promise? No.
[Defense counsel]: You cannot promise that?
JUROR NO. 608: (shakes head.)
[Defense counsel]: Okay. At least will you be willing to promise me
that you will not be willing to hold that against Mr. Adams, the
individual I'm trying to help over here?
(Jury Sel. Tr., p.313, L.17 - p.314, L.2.)
Upon hearing that dialogue, the district judge interjected, "Counsel, with all
due respect, I'm not going to allow you to require her to promise." (Jury Sel. Tr.,
p.314, Ls.3-5.) Adams' attorney then continued his questions to that potential
juror:

[Defense counsel]: Okay. Will you be willing to do your best to
make sure if that happens in this case, you do not hold that against
Mr. Adams, the individual I'm trying to help in this case?
JUROR NO. 608: Yes, I will do my best.
[Defense counsel]: You will do your best. That's all we can ask for.
(Jury Sel. Tr., p.314. Ls.6-12.)
Adams' trial counsel did not make any motion to strike juror 608 from the
jury pool, and, after 11 peremptory challenges were exercised by each side, juror
608 remained on the panel. (Jury Sel. Tr., p.346, L.22 - p.349, L.18.)
On appeal, Adams argues he did not receive a fair jury because the trial
court did not spontaneously strike juror 608 for bias. (Appellant's brief, pp.1022.) This argument fails because (1) Adarns cannot ask the appellate court to
grant a motion to strike that he declined to make to the trial court, (2) Adams has
failed to show that juror 608 should have been struck from the jury pool for bias,
and (3) Adams cannot establish he was prejudiced by juror 608 remaining on the
jury .
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict is

directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Hedser, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d
1331, 1333 (1989).

C.

Adams' Claim Of Error In The Juw Selection Process Is Not Preserved
For Appellate Review
It is well settled in ldaho that challenges to the suitability of jurors must be

made before the jury is empanelled. I.C. 3 19-2006; State v. Hansen, 127 ldaho
675, 678, 904 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Yon, 115 ldaho 907,
771 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Ruvbal, 102 ldaho 885, 643 P.2d 835 (Ct.
App. 1982)). Failure to challenge a juror for cause indicates satisfaction with the
jury selected. State v. Bitz, 93 ldaho 239, 243, 460 P.2d 374, 378 (1969).
Here, Adams made no challenge to juror 608 sitting on the jury. After the
district court precluded defense counsel from requiring juror 608 to promise that,
if the jury had to be excused, she would not hold it against Adams, the juror
assured Adams' counsel she "will do my best" to not hold it against Adams. (Jury
Sel. Tr., p.313, L.17 - p.314, L.lO.) At that point, defense counsel replied, "You
will do your best. That's all we can ask for." (Jury Sel. Tr., p.314, Ls.11-12.)
Adams' counsel made no motion to strike juror 608.

After extensive voir dire,

both sides passed the panel for cause. Having eleven peremptory challenges to
exercise, Adams' counsel chose not to strike juror 608. Adams' satisfaction at
trial with juror 608's fitness to be a juror is clear; his newly found appellate
disgruntlement should not be considered.

D.

The District Court Was Properlv Concerned About Defense Counsel's
Reauest That Juror 608 Make A "Promise" To Him
The district court refused to allow Adams' trial counsel to require juror 608

to "promise" she would not hold it against Adams if the jury were excused from
the courtroom on occasion, stating: "Counsel, with all due respect, I'm not going

to allow you to require her to promise." (Jury SeI. Tr., p.314, Ls.3-5.) The district
court astutely noticed there is, indeed, something to be leery of when prospective
jurors are asked by lawyers to make promises. It appears that the district court
was completely centered on the form of the question -- requiring a promise -- and
was not attempting to keep Adams's counsel from exploring the subject of bias in
other ways. In State v. Holmquest, 243 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Mo. App. 2007), the
Missouri Court of Appeals explained:
There are certain limits to voir dire, however. Counsel may
not, for instance, try the case on voir dire, may not attempt to elicit
a commitment from the jurors about how they would react to
hypothetical facts, and may not seek to predispose any of the jurors
to react a certain way to anticipated evidence. [State v.] Clark,981
S.W.2d [I431 at 146-47. "[Wlhen the inquiry includes questions
phrased or framed in such manner that they require the one
answering to speculate on his own reaction to such an extent that
he tends to feel obligated to react in that manner, prejudice can be
created. The limitation is not as to the information sought but in the
manner of asking. Id. (quoting State v. Garreff, 627 S.W.2d 635,
642 (Mo. Banc 1982)).
As stated in Holmquest, the limitation on voir dire is not "as to the
information sought but in the manner of asking."

Id. Other courts have voiced

their concern about the practice by attorneys in obtaining promises during jury
selection. See Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
("Commitment questions require a venireman to promise that he will base his
verdict or course of action on some specific set of facts before he has heard any
evidence"); Nicholson v. State, 761 So.2d 924, 927 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)
(quoting Robinson v. State, 726 So.2d 189 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998)) ("'Mississippi
case law prohibits attorney from attempting to elicit promises from the jury

promising that under a hypothetical set of circumstances, they will return a
specific verdict."')
Even though the district court precluded the form of the question posed by
Adams' trial counsel (i.e. "promise") to juror 608, the court did not limit counsel's
ability to explore the subject of bias in any other manner. Counsel could have
followed up with a variety of questions (without using the word "promise") aimed
at determining whether juror 608 could, in fact, hear the case impartially. Nothing
precluded him from asking juror 608 whether she would follow the instructions by
the court, decide the case based only on the evidence presented at trial, and be
fair to both sides.
In short, the district court did not curtail Adams ability to determine through
proper questioning whether juror 608 could be a fair and impartial juror.

E.

Adams Has Failed To Show That Juror 608 Should Have Been Struck
From The Jury Pool For Bias

A challenge to the jury selection process that was not timely raised in the
trial court will not be considered on appeal absent a showing of fundamental
error. Hansen, 127 ldaho at 678, 904 P.2d at 948 (citing Yon, 115 ldaho at 909,
771 P.2d at 927). To demonstrate fundamental error, a defendant must show
"an error which resulted in a failure to afford him a fair trial."

Yon,

7 15 ldaho at

909, 771 P.2d at 927 (citing State v. LePaae, 102 ldaho 387, 630 P.2d 674, cerf.
denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981)).

Adams cannot show error, much less

fundamental error, in the district court's failure to spontaneously strike juror 608
from the jury pool.

Contrary to Adams' appellate argument, this case is not like State v.
Houser, 143 Idaho 603, 610, 150 P.3d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 2006), where there
was clear bias towards a party (juror would tend to believe officer's testimony at
trial over defendant's testimony), and no "unequivocal assurance of the ability to
be impartial despite several efforts by the court or counsel to elicit such an
assurance."

(See Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.)

Here, after juror 608 was

informed by defense counsel there might be times when the jury would have to
be excused, counsel asked her if she would "promise" to not "hold that against"
either "myself' or the state

- to which she replied, "Do I promise?

No." (Jury

Sel. Tr., p.313, Ls.17-21.) However, juror 608 was not asked whether, if the jury
were repeatedly excused, she would not assume evidence damaging to Adams
was being kept out at trial and hold that against Adams.
Rather, having expressed dissatisfaction with her previous jury experience
of being repeatedly excused from the courtroom, juror 608 was asked by Adams'
counsel if she would promise not to hold it against either the state or himself if
that occurred again -- i.e., if legal issues were taken up "in the absence of the
jury." (Jury Sel. Tr., p.313, Ls.12-15.) By her unwillingness to "promise" she
would not hold it against either counsel if there were repeated trips in and out of
the jury room, juror 608 expressed her frustration with her past experience as a
juror. However, juror 608 did not say, nor was she asked, whether she would
assume from repeated trips outside the courtroom that evidence damaging to
Adams was being kept out of the jury's view, or whether she would hold such
assumption against Adams in determining his case.

Juror 608 was simply

unable to "promise" she would not be displeased or irritated with either counsel if
the jury had to repeatedly retreat from the courtroom; that does not mean she
was biased against Adams.
In Hauser, where a juror was unable to set aside his bias favoring police
officers' testimony, "the State's case turned largely upon the testimony of a
detective who had interviewed Hauser." Hauser, 143 ldaho at 610, 150 P.3d at
303. In contrast to the material role such juror bias (may have) played in the
outcome of the trial in Hauser, here the district court's focus was on preventing
defense counsel from obtaining a "promise" with regard to the possibility that
juror 608 might become dissatisfied with counsel if there were repeated trips
outside the courtroom: "Counsel, with all due respect, I'm not going to allow you
to require her to promise." (Jury Sel. Tr., p.314, Ls.3-5.) Juror 608's reluctance
to promise she would not hold it against either counsel if the jury had to be
repeatedly excused from the courtroom does not demonstrate any bias at all.
Moreover, there was no subsequent attempt by Adams' counsel to ask
juror 608 whether, despite her predisposition to becoming irritated at repeated
courtroom exits, she could still follow the instructions by the court, decide the
case based only on the evidence presented at trial, and be fair to both sides. Cf
Hauser, 143 ldaho at 610, 150 P.3d at 303 ("When the juror was asked if he
could put his bias aside during the trial, he responded, 'I don't think so.'") In
short, Adams has failed to demonstrate that juror 608 was biased in any way
material to the decision-making role of a juror.

F.

Adams Cannot Establish He Was Preiudiced BV Juror 608 Remaininq On
The Jury
On appeal, Adams claims there were nine situations that arose during trial

which reflect the "very procedure that dissatisfied Juror 608 with the legal
process in her previous jury experience . . . ." (Appellant's brief, p.19.) Of those
nine episodes, Adams concedes that some involve general requests by counsel
to "discuss issues outside [the jury's] presence without any specific knowledge
that the parties would be discussing what piece of evidence or testimony was
being discussed," and other times when, although the jury was made aware that
evidence was being discussed, all the exhibits were eventually admitted. (Id.
(explanation added).) Adams focuses on the three remaining incidents, which he
asserts demonstrate that juror 608's presence on the jury was prejudicial to his
case.6 (Id. at pp.19-22.) Assuming, arguendo, that it was error for the district
court to not spontaneously strike juror 608 from the jury pool, Adams cannot
demonstrate prejudice in any of the three instances he cites.
The ldaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Johnson, 145 ldaho 970,
188 P.3d 912 (2008), is instructive in on this issue. In Johnson, during voir dire a
juror ("Juror 85") "expressed a concern that 'if evidence was presented by a
specialist, and then for some reason [the court] would tell [the jury] to completely
disregard that, and [he] felt that it was good evidence, then [he] [doesn't ] know if
[he] could completely disregard it."' Johnson, 145 Idaho at -,

188 P.3d at

Adams argues that prejudice is shown "in light of the fact that the very process
Juror 608 despised occurred on multiple occasions, and that she was well aware
that the process deprived her the ability to review all of the evidence that she
knew existed, but was inadmissible." (Appellant's brief, pp.21-22.)

920-921 (explanations in original). After holding the district court did not act
erroneously in allowing the juror to remain on the panel, the court further opined:
Moreover, Johnson has failed to demonstrate she was prejudiced
by Juror 85's presence on the panel. Juror 85's concern was that
he may have difficulty completely disregarding evidence from a
specialist. Johnson has pointed to several instances where the
judge instructed the jurors to disregard certain information.
However, in most of those instances either the evidence did not
come from a specialist or after an appropriate foundation was laid,
the evidence was allowed. The only relevant instance of any such
instruction Johnson pointed to occurred when the judge instructed
the jury to disregard testimony by an expert witness that it was
possible during the manufacturing process of making the latex
gloves. This single instance of the judge instructing the jury to
disregard evidence presented by a specialist is insufficient to show
Johnson sustained any prejudice by juror 85's presence on the
panel.
Johnson,l45 Idaho at __,

188 P.3d at 922.

As in Johnson, none of the three instances cited by Adams are sufficient
to show he "sustained any prejudice" by juror 608's presence on the panel.
1.

Defense Exhibit A -- Mikeal Campbell's Written Statement

Adams first claimed example of prejudice in regard to juror 608's alleged
bias is:
First, when Mr. Campbell was testifying, he was shown the
statement he wrote out for police the night of the incident, identified
as Defense Exhibit A. On re-direct, the State offered Defense
Exhibit A, defense counsel stat [sic] that "there might . . . need to be
a discussion about that," and the court excused the jury. Defense
A was not admitted and, because of Mr. Adams' counsel, Juror 608
never learned what was in Mr. Campbell's written statement.
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20 (all citations to record omitted).)
However, an attentive juror 608 would not have thought that any evidence
damaging to Adams was being kept from the jury. Adams' trial counsel had

extensively cross-examined Mikeal Campbell about what he had written in his
statement to law enforcement, specially pointing out (1) Campbell had scratched
out $3 and replaced it with $10 in regard to the amount of money Adams
demanded from the three men in the back seat of Adams's car, and (2) Campbell
did not write in his statement that Adams had run a red light. (Tr., p.122, L.6 p.124, L.7; p.130, Ls.4-9; p.137, L.17 - p.138, L.20; p.150, Ls.11-19.) Upon redirect examination of Campbell, the prosecution attempted to rehabilitate him by
asking him if he had reviewed it, if there were "any corrections besides scratching
out the 3," whether it otherwise was an accurate record of what he wrote. (Tr.,
p.149, Ls.5-17.) Campbell also related that his written statement "[plretty close
depicts what we went through that night." (Tr., p.149, Ls.18-19.) At that point,
the prosecutor moved for admission of Campbell's written statement (Defense
Exhibit A), and the jury was excused from the courtroom after Adams' counsel
stated that there needed to be discussion about the motion. (Tr., p.149, L.23

-

p.150, L.9.)
Hearing all of the discourse leading up to the jury's exclusion from the
courtroom, juror 608 would have plainly understood that Defense Exhibit A was
simply repetitive of Campbell's testimony, and intended to buttress his testimony
after it had been impeached by Adams' trial counsel. That realization would have
been made all the more clear upon the jury's return to the courtroom, when
Campbell was asked by the prosecutor whether "that statement accurately
describe[s] what happened that night?" -- to which he responded "correct." (Tr.,
p.152, Ls.5-12.) There is nothing about the exclusion of Campbell's written

statement that would have made juror 608 suspect it differed in any material way

-- much less in a way that was more damaging to Adams -- than Campbell's
testimony.
2.

State's Exhibit 33 -- Deputy Miller's Tape Recording

Steve Maylin testified that when the police arrived at the crime scene, he
did not think he was crying, although he was very upset. (Tr., p.258, Ls. 3-13.)
Later in the state's case, while Canyon County Deputy Sheriff Eric Miller was
testifying, the prosecutor began to lay the foundation to admit State's Exhibit 33,
a recording that made from the pocket recorder of Deputy Miller when he arrived
at the crime scene, in order to show the upset and crying demeanor of Stephen
Maylin, who had testified otherwise. However, the prosecutor did not expressly
state in front of the jury that the questions he was asking the deputy were
intended to gain admission of that piece of evidence. (See Tr., p.439, L.22 p.442, L.8.)

After the prosecutor asked the deputy if the numbers on the

recordings are unique to each incident, and said "Mr. Bailiff," Adarns' trial counsel
intervened, stating:
Judge, there has to be a discussion if the State is attempting
to do what I presume they are attempting to do. I think we talked
about this already. I've made my intention known to the Court.
(Tr., p.442, Ls.6-14.)
The court then excused the jury, and after the prosecutor affirmed his
intention to admit the tape recording to show that, contrary to Stephen Maylin's
testimony, Maylin was crying at the scene of the crime, the court concluded the

tape contained hearsay and denied its admission. (Tr., p.444, L.9 - p.445, L.7;
p.449, Ls.7-13.)
The jury would have had no clue of what was excluded from their
consideration by the court's ruling in regard to State's Exhibit 33.

The first

question by the prosecutor was, "Now, if we could go back a little bit back to
when you arrived on the the [sic] scene, are your interactions with these people
recorded?" (Tr., p.439, Ls.22-24.) Although Deputy Miller's testimony revealed
he had had contact at the crime scene with Sgt. Bowen, Mikeal Campbell,
Stephen Maylin, there is no indication in the remainder of the foundational
questions by the prosecutor of what was contained on the tape. (See Tr., p.439.
L.22 - p.442, L.8.) Deputy Miller did not even recall who he was speaking to
when he "got new batteries" at the scene and "activated the recorder." (Tr.,
p.440, Ls.15-25.) Clearly, there was absolutely no basis for juror 608 to have
suspected that anything damaging about Adams had been kept out of the trial -unless she engaged in totally unrestrained speculation. (See Appellant's brief,
p.20 n.1 I)('it is quite possible that the jury was not aware of what conversation
Deputy Miller recorded.").

There is nothing about the exclusion of a tape

recording that the jury was told practically nothing about that could have caused
juror 608 to conclude damaging evidence was kept from the jury's eyes.
3.

Deputv Faulhaber's Volunteered Comment

The last instance Adams cites as allegedly showing that the district court's
retention of juror 608 was prejudicial occurred when Canyon County Deputy
Sheriff Tami Faulhaber testified. She stated that, while waiting for Adams to

arrive at his home on South Kimball at about 2:54 a.m. on March 11, 2006, she
saw a white car pull up, whereupon she and Sgt. Bowen ordered the two males
in the car to get out. (Tr., p.549, L.2 - p.553, L.I.) However, Deputy Faulhaber
next volunteered, "I recognized the driver as Clayton Adams. I'd dealt with him
before." (Tr., p.553, Ls.1-2.) Adams' trial counsel immediately objected, and
asked for a cautionary instruction, and asked to have a motion heard outside the
presence of the jury. (Tr., p.553, Ls.3-6.) Outside the presence of the jury, the
defense counsel moved to dismiss the case, which the district court construed as
a motion for a mistrial, and denied, after asking the state to remind its witnesses
not to engage in such testimony. (Tr., p.554, L.2 - p.555, L.16.)
Although the blurting out of the comment by Deputy Faulhaber was
obviously inappropriate, that incident did not suggest to juror 608 that any
damaging testimony offered by the state was being kept out of the trial -- the
state was not trying to offer any testimony that the court, after excusing the jury,
ruled inadmissible. Instead, the deputy's inappropriately blurted comment was
heard by the jury, and the jury was excused so that defense counsel could try to
remedy what had just occurred in court. That is quite different from Adams'
assertion that if it became clear to juror 608 that, after a recess, evidence sought
to be admitted by the prosecution was not allowed by the court, she would think
damaging information about Adams was being excluded. The fact that defense
counsel asked to have his motion to dismiss heard outside the presence of the
jury did not suggest the court was keeping out evidence sought to be admitted by
the state.

4.

Conclusion

None of the three instances Adams relies on are sufficient to show he
sustained any prejudice from juror 608's presence on the jury panel. See
Johnson,l45 Idaho at -,

188 P.3d at 922.

It.
Adams Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Prosecutorial Misconduct

rn

A.

Introduction
Adams argues on appeal that the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal were

misconduct "by appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury by
exclaiming that the State was seeking 'justice' for Mikeal Campbell, Stephen
Maylin, and Tyler Gorely, and by seeking Tustice' for Clayton Adams." Adams
has failed to establish any basis for reversal, however, because he has failed to
establish that his due process rights were violated as a result of any alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, because there was no objection to the
prosecutor's rebuttal comments during trial, Adams' must demonstrate that such
comments constitute fundamental error, which he has failed to do

5.

Standard Of Review And General Leqal Standards Governina Claims Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct unless he can establish two things: ( I ) the complained of conduct
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-

m,139 ldaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere

assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by
the United States Supreme Court:

"[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors'

remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwriqht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") In that regard, the
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain
silent."

at 181-82.

However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly

overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 , 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's
ability to judge the evidence fairly."

Id. at

11-12. Consistent with Darden and

m,the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to

result in fundamental error. State v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d

With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing
argument the Supreme Court has stated:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event;
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations
in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from
the plethora of less damaging interpretations.
Donnellv v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 ldaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33
(1986)). The ldaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[tlhe right to due
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d
1002,1008 (Ct. App. 1991)

Application of the foregoing standards to Adams' claim of prosecutorial
misconduct reveals he was not deprived of a fair trial
C.

The Prosecutor's Requests For Justice Did Not Constitute Misconduct
In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor commented, in relevant part:
So I just want to make it real clear what it is that we are
asking for. We are asking for justice.
We are asking that you find Clayton Adams guilty of three
counts of attempted robbery for demanding money from the back
seat passengers and threatening to stab them if he didn't get the
cash.
We are asking that you find Clayton Adams guilty of
aggravated battery for stabbing Stephen Maylin as he tried to run
away.
We are asking that you find Clayton Adams guilty of first
degree murder for stabbing Tyler Gorley five times and leaving him
to die in the road.

We spoke at the beginning about how on March 1 of '06,
Clayton Adams was in the driver's seat, how he's not anymore, that
you are. And as you take that wheel and we slide into the back
seat, mere passengers at this point, we ask one thing, that you take
us home, home to justice, justice for Mike Campbell who watched
his friend die, justice for Stephen Maylin who got stabbed trying to
run away from someone he didn't even know, justice for Tyler
Gorley whose death is the reason we are here and whose life is
insulted by the story that he wants you to believe, and justice for
Clayton Adams who did these things, who you know committed
these crimes, and who thought so little of it, that he went and
bought beer.
We ask for justice. Thank you.
(Tr., p.973, L.21 - p.975, L.l (emphasis added).)

On appeal, Adams specifically asserts the prosecutor's comments sought
justice for: (1) Mike Campbell for "having to 'watch his friend die,"' (2) Tyler
Gorley because "his life is insulted by Mr. Adams' claim of self defense," and (3)
Clayton Adams because he "committed these crimes, and who thought so little of
it, that he went and bought beer."'

(Appellant's brief, p.25.) However, Adams

overlooks the fact that the prosecutor's calls to justice were actually "for" the
various crimes Adams was charged with committing (see Tr., p.973, L.22 - p.974,
L.8) -- not the brief asides partially describing each person's role on the early
morning of March 11, 2006 (see Tr., p.975, L.l).
Further, although he did not object to any of the foregoing comments at
trial, Adams claims "this Court cannot declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the jury would have returned the same verdict absent the prosecutor
inappropriately asking them to impose 'justice."'

(Appellant's brief, p.26.)

Adams' claim fails. The prosecutor's request that the jury give Adams and the
three alleged victimss justice was not improper. See State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho
90, 98, 337 P.2d 1, 6 (1959) ("The general rule is that argument by the

' Having substituted the true subjects of the prosecutor's calls for justice with the

brief descriptors given by the prosecutor when he subsequently mentioned the
names of the victims and defendant, Adams criticizes the prosecutor for calling
on the jury to provide justice to Mikeal Campbell for having to "watch his friend
die" because "it is not the jury's duty to provide him with comfort, or satisfaction,
or 'justice."' (Appellant's brief, p.25.) Next, Adams states the obvious, explaining
the jury's role "was not to determine whether Mr. Gorley's life was insulted" by his
Lastly, Adams derisively relates that "the jury was not
self-defense claim. )&I(
there to give [him] 'justice' or [sic] whether he should be punished for buying
beer. (Id.)
At the time the deputy prosecutor made his rebuttal remarks, the three men
who had ridden in the back seat of Adams' car were all alleged to have been
victims of at least attempted robbery. (See R., pp.27-31.)

prosecuting attorney merely urging the jurors in a criminal prosecution to do their
duty, and to enforce the criminal law generally or the particular law under which
the prosecution was instituted, does not constitute a ground for a new trial or a
reversal but is within the range of proper argument.") (citation omitted); People v.
Medina, (1995) 1ICal.4th 694, 759-60, 906 P.2d 2, 40 (no prejudice caused by
prosecutor's urging to 'do the right thing, to do justice, not for our society,
necessarily or exclusively, but for [the homicide victim]"'.); see also State v.
65 Ohio St.3d 597,611, 605 N.E.2d 916,930 (1992) ("A prosecutor does

S&&,

not act improperly in calling for justice for the people of Ohio.")
Rather, the prosecutor's rebuttal argument was a proper, measured
response to Adams' arguments that Tyler Gorley's fatal injuries came during a
drunken fight in which Adams was merely defending himself, and Stephen Maylin
was trying to avoid having his injury detected because he "was hiding his
participation in the fight." (Tr., p.948, Ls.10--12; p.955, L.8
L.4

-

p.966, L.15.)

- p.956, L.2;

p.963,

Adams has not divulged any authority holding that a

prosecutor's call for "justice" constitutes misconduct. Such an argument begs
two questions; (1) how is a defendant harmed by a request for justice? and (2)
what, instead of justice, should prosecutors be asking of juries?

Adams'

argument runs counter to common sense.
Even if this brief portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument could be
deemed improper, it does not amount to fundamental error. The sole contested
element at trial was whether Adams acted in self-defense in stabbing Tyler
Gorley and Stephen Maylin. Asking the jury to "do justice" for Tyler Goriey,

Stephen Maylin, Mikeal Campbell, and Clayton Adams did not so infect the trial
with unfairness that it violated due process because it could not have influenced
the jury to convict Adams of second degree murder and aggravated battery
without sufficient evidence, particularly since the jury could have believed
conviction of lesser offenses than second degree murder and aggravated battery
would have been adequate to give Tyler Gorley, Stephen Maylin, and Clayton
Adams 'Tustice."
Because Adams' claim of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first time
on appeal does not constitute error, much less fundamental error, he is not
entitled to relief.
Ill.
Adams Has Failed To Establish That Any Error Which May Have Occurred
During His Trial Is Reversible Under The Cumulative Error Doctrine

Adams claims there was an accumulation of errors that deprived him of a
fair trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.) Specifically, Adams asserts the previously
discussed claims that the trial court erred by failing to spontaneously striking
Juror 608, and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by calling for "justice"
during closing argument, created a cumulative prejudicial effect that requires
reversal of his conviction. (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Contrary to Adams' claim,
has failed to establish the existence of more than one error and, consequently,
he cannot establish cumulative error.
The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities,
each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process.

State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998). A necessary
predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
V.

State

Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).
Adams has failed to establish the existence of any error arising out of any

alleged failure of the trial court to strike Juror 608 from the jury panel, or from the
prosecutor's request for 'Tustice" during his rebuttal argument -- thus, those acts
afford no basis for relief under the cumulative error doctrine. Because Adams
has failed to show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, the cumulative
error doctrine is inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho
115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997).
IV.
Adams Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
When It Imposed A Life Sentence With 25 Years Fixed Upon His Conviction For
Second Deqree Murder, And A Consecutive Ten Year Sentence With Three
Years Fixed For Agqravated Battery

A.

Introduction
Adams argues that his total unified sentence of life plus ten years, with

twenty-eight years fixed is excessive, "in light of his young age, the role alcohol
played in the instant offense and his desire for treatment, the support he enjoys
from his family and friends, and his remorse." (Appellant's brief, p.29.) However,
considering any view of the facts, Adams has failed to establish that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing a life sentence with twenty-five years
fixed upon Adams' conviction for second degree murder, and a consecutive ten
year sentence, with three years fixed, for aggravated battery.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal the appellate

court conducts an independent review of the record that considers the nature of
the offense, the defendant's character and protection of society. State v. Reinke,
103 ldaho 771,772,653 P.2d 1183,1184 (Ct. App. 1982). "Absent a showing of
a clear abuse of discretion, a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed
on appeal." State v. Hedqer, 115 ldaho 598,604,768 P.2d 1331,1337 (1989)
C.

Adams Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Imposed A Life Sentence With 25 Years Fixed Upon
His Conviction For Second Deqree Murder, And A Consecutive Ten Year
Sentence With Three Years Fixed For Aggravated Battery
To determine whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, an

appellate court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the
case," including the record, and considers the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender. State v. Cope, 142 ldaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241,
j249 (2006). To prevail, the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable
view of the facts, the sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal
punishment. State v. Stover, 140 ldaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).
Those objectives are "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Cross, 132 ldaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227,
231 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
Adams' life sentence with twenty-five years fixed is within the statutory
limits for second degree murder. LC. 3 18-4004 ("Every person guilty of murder

of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years
and the imprisonment may extend to life."). Additionally, Adams' aggravated
battery sentence -- ten years with three years fixed - is within the statutory limits
for that crime. I.C.

3 18-908 (aggravated battery punishable "in the state prison

not to exceed fifteen (15) years"). Adams does not contend his sentences fall
outside of the statutory limits. Instead, he asserts the trial court abused its
sentencing discretion in light of his young age, the role alcohol played in the
offenses, his support from family and friends, and his expressions of remorse.
(Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.)
Although Adams' arguments may have some relevancy to sentencing, a
sentencing court is not required to assess or balance all of the sentencing goals
in an equal manner. State v. Dushkin, 124 ldaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663, 665
(Ct. App. 1993). "As a matter of policy in ldaho, the primary consideration is the
good order and protection of society. All other factors must be subservient to
that end." State v. Hunnel, 125 ldaho 623, 627, 873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994) (citing
State v. Moore, 78 ldaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)).
While sentencing Adams the district court judge noted she was guided by
"probably the most famous" case on sentencing, State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565,
650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982), "and then specifically the criteria in ldaho Code
Section 19-2521," which sets out the criteria for placing a defendant on probation
or imposing imprisonment. (Sent. Tr., p.96, Ls.11-17.) The court explained,
"First and foremost, I have to decide whether there's an undue risk that (Adams]
will commit another crime." (Sent. Tr., p.97, Ls.1-3; see I.C. 3 19-2521(a).)

The district court recounted Adams' extensive juvenile court record, which
began when Adams was thirteen years old and became more serious over time beginning with tobacco and runaway violations and culminating in convictions for
two counts of forgery (with two other counts dismissed). (Sent. Tr., p.97, L.18 p.100, L.5; see Presentence Report ("PSI"), pp.4-5.)

The district court also

considered (as "contacts with law enforcement") that Adams had had other
charges dismissed in 2001: controlled substance -- frequenting, possession of
paraphernalia, and failure to appear. (Sent. Tr., p.98, L.24

- p.99,

p.L.8; see

PSI, p.5.) The court observed, "It started back - no respect for family, no respect
for rules, no respect for the law back when you were thirteen, and it started with
the cigarettes, so I guess you should have been thinking about I'm getting in
more and more trouble, maybe I ought to do something about it." (Sent. Tr.,
p.99, Ls.20-25.)
The district court next summarized Adams' adult court record, which
included two minor consumptions, misdemeanor battery, a dismissed charge of
insufficient funds, driving without privileges, and three DUls - resulting in Adams'
conviction for felony DUI in 2004, when Adams was twenty years old. (Sent. Tr.,
p.100, L . l - p.lO1, L.8; PSI, pp.5-7.) For his felony DUI conviction, Adams was
placed in the retained jurisdiction ("rider") program and subsequently placed on
probation. (Sent. Tr., p.101, Ls.9-20.) The PSI further revealed that Adams'
behavior had not changed while he was in jail:
Canyon County Detention Center records indicate that since his
arrival on March 11, 2006, the defendant has received numerous
Intent to Discipline notices for the following violations: Disrespect
to Staff, Failure to Comply, Possession of Contraband, Interfering

With Clothing Exchange, Causing a Disturbance in the Unit, Acts of
Violence, Violation of Rules, and Participating in a Disturbance. He
threatened staff and had to be forcibly escorted andlor moved on at
least two occasions.
(PSI, p.8.)
The district court reasoned that, given his criminal history, Adams would
not be able to change his criminal behavior, stating:
What I see here is you committing one crime after one crime
after another crime. It's just a pattern started at age thirteen till you
ended up in the Canyon County Jail March llth
of last year. As a
result, you stand before me with all these juvenile adjudications,
misdemeanor convictions, and then the prior felony and the two
that you're before me today on.
The weight of your behavior shows me and proves to me
that it is most probable that you will continue to engage and
continue criminal behavior. You were given all these chances in
the juvenile court, you were given all of these chances at probation
in the misdemeanor courts, and you were given the best Idaho has
to give, in my opinion, when you were convicted of the felony.
(Sent. Tr., p.103, Ls.7-16.)
In considering the seriousness of Adams' crimes, the sentencing court
explained it could not find that the victims contributed in some way to Adams'
offenses. (Sent. Tr., p.104, Ls.12-17; see LC. § 19-2521(2)(e).) The court then
explained to Adams that he had ""brutally and violently" taken the. life of Tyler
Gorley, most likely by:

. . . stabbing Tyler Gorley in the buttock, and then once he was
injured, you finished him off with a bunch more stab wounds. And
one of the things that bothered me immensely at the trial was when
the pathologist came in here and testified, You cut all the way
through a rib.
And again, then I have to go back to stabbing, stabbing.
How could you not know you stabbed somebody? You knew you
stabbed somebody. You had your knife out in your hand.

The evidence suggests that all three of the back seat
passengers were trying to flee from you. Unfortunately, Tyler
Gorley was seated in the middle, as I recall the evidence, and had
less physical agility and capability of fleeing you because of that
and because of his physical problems that his family's talked about.

Adams cites State v. Nice, 103 ldaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982), to support
his contention that the district court failed to adequately consider his substance
abuse (alcohol) problem as a mitigating factor.

(Brief in Support, p.30.)

However, substance abuse can also be considered an aggravating factor. State

m,120 ldaho 955, 958, 821 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The judge
also enumerated the factors in aggravation" such as "King's history of substance
abuse and past criminal conduct.") See State v. Galaviz, 123 ldaho 47, 48-49,
844 P.2d 29, 30-31 (Ct. App. 1992) (declining to reduce the defendant's
sentence where it was obvious that "alcohol and drugs played a part in [the
defendant's] illegal activities").
Regardless of how substance abuse is characterized, this is not a
situation where, as in Q,

the trial court did not give proper consideration of the

defendant's substance abuse problem.

Nice,

103 ldaho at 91, 645 P.2d at 325.

The district court was well aware that Adams had been afforded many
opportunities to overcome his substance abuse problem, all to no avail. Adams
received the benefit of two druglalcohol evaluations; one diagnosing him in April,
2003, as having "a probable problem with alcohol use, and [that he] could be
entering the first stage of chemical dependence [sic]" (PSI, p.1 I),
and a second
evaluation (following his conviction for felony DUI) which concluded Adams had

"an alcohol or drug-related problem, demonstrating early signs of alcoholism, and
having probable abuse problems" (PSI, p.12). While on his rider for felony DUI,
Adams completed the substance abuse education and relapse prevention
program. (PSI, p.1I.) Also, Adams informed his presentence investigator that
"he was actively participating in classes held at Crossroads Counseling Services
prior to committing the instant offense." (PSI, p.1I . )
Plainly, the district court took Adams' alcohol problem, and his failed
opportunities to address it through treatment, into account at sentencing.
Nonetheless, it determined that the need to protect society from Adams' violent
conduct was overriding.
The district court also considered, and discounted, Adams' alleged
remorse for his crimes. (See Sent. Tr., p.79, L.22 - p.82, L.6; p.84, Ls.6-14.)
However, the court did not appear to have been impressed with Adams' belated
show of remorse:
Well, you're the one who got out of the car, you're the one who
went after them, and you're the one with the knife. Clearly you had
to know the consequences, and you drove off into the night and
bought beer at the closest store.
And when law enforcement asked you about it, you weren't
concerned about what injuries you had caused or whether there
was life or death of someone else. You suddenly had an excuse
that you weren't there. And then your questions concerned your
bail, what was going to happen to you, when you were going to get
an attorney. And you have every right to that, but I have watched,
like every member o the victim's family, to see some type of
compassion in you. And I see that in trials. I see people who are
on trial or are in here and are truly sorry for what happened.
(Sent. Tr., p.107, Ls.6-21.) A sentencing court is not bound by a defendant's
statement of remorse, "but may discount its credibility and impact on sentencing."

State v. Hoffman, 123 ldaho 638, 648, 851 P.2d 934, 944 (1993); State v.
Kerrigan, 123 ldaho 508, 513, 849 P.2d 969, 974 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, the
district court was not required to accept Adams' self-serving statements of
remorse as a reason to impose a lesser sentence
The sentencing court was also troubled that, despite having strong
support from his family, Adams continued his criminal behavior, explaining:
And I think one of the reasons I have more trouble with you than I
often do with other defendants is because you shouldn't be in here.
You've got a family who has stood behind you, who has bailed you
out time after time and is still here for you today.
(Sent. Tr., p.97, Ls.11-16.) Later in the sentencing hearing the court further
explained:
I'm also allowed under 19-2521(i) to consider your character and
attitudes as to whether they would indicate the commission of
criminal activity. And this has bothered me again throughout this
proceeding. And I believe that Tyler's aunt said it the best this
morning when she testified. She said how could someone who
seemed so put together and has a supportive family, how could
they stab a person five times.
And I kept looking through this presentence and I kept
thinking there's some type of a Jekyll-Hyde thing going on here.
He's got all the skills, he's got the support, he's got the tools he
needs. And your brother commented today about what a great
person you are when you're clean and sober. . . .
Dr. Moore, your pastor talked about that. He talked about
the fact that you have changed and that that was a big hope of your
family. Your sister talked about what a good person you were,
attending church, they talked about doing good works.
All throughout this time, the last ten years, you've also been
committing crime after crime after crime.
(Sent. Tr., p.108, L.3 - p.109, L.2.) The court next discussed the fact that at age
fifteen, Adams was diagnosed with "oppositional defiant disorder," which is

characterized by "two different sets of problems, aggressiveness and the
tendency to bother. It's defined as an enduring pattern of uncooperative, defiant,
hostile behavior towards authority figures." (Sent. Tr., p.?09, Ls.6-15.) The court
noted that such disorder "sounds like you to me. Your dad, who has stood
beside you for 23 years, talked to you. He knew you had an alcohol problem.
You said you could handle it. You handled it, all right. You went out and killed
one person and stabbed another." (Sent. Tr., p.110, Ls.6-10.) The district court
was well within its discretion to conclude that, despite having such a supportive
family, Adams would continue doing what his family could not prevent him from
doing the previous ten years -- commit more crimes.
In that vein, the district court found, in obvious reference to I.C. 5 19-2521
(l)(f), that Adams is a "professional criminal," which (the court implied) lessened
the chance Adams could be rehabilitated and the need to give him leniency.
(Sent. Tr., p.llO, L.25.) The court next discussed the need for deterrence -specifically of Adams:
Tyler Gorley's life cannot be brought back. Steve Maylin's
health cannot be brought back. But imprisonment will ensure that
you can no longer threaten other citizens in this community.
You are clearly in need of correctional treatment and society
is clearly in need of protection from you. You have terrorized your
family, this community, and society for ten years. You're done, Mr.
Adams, because I'm going to end it today.
Deterrence is a criteria for me to consider. And although it
certainly can be argued by criminal lawyers and others that
deterrence isn't always what it's set out to be, it does protect the
public, and it will remove any opportunity for you to repeat similar
criminal activity to other persons.

(Sent. Tr., p.1 II,Ls.1-15.) The district court concluded by explaining, "The real
question here is how many years is the appropriate punishment, how many years
will deter you, how many years will protect society." (Sent. Tr., p.111, Ls.15-18.)
Adams' sentence is not excessive given the nature of his offenses and the
character of the offender. It was well within the district court's discretion to, first
and foremost, protect society and keep the public safe from Adams' fits of rage
that could kill or seriously injure innocent people -- such as Tyler Gorley and
Mikeal Campbell. Adams' sentence is necessary to deter himself and others
from engaging in such dangerous conduct. In the district court's words, Adams
"brutally and violently" took the life of Tyler Gorley, who, from all accounts was a
"hard-working kid, he was a good son, he was a good brother, a good nephew,
[and] he was a loyal friend." (Sent. Tr., p.106, Ls.11-15.) Under any reasonable
view of the facts in this case, a twenty-five year fixed sentence for second degree
murder, and a consecutive three-year fixed sentence for aggravated battery, are
not excessive. Adams has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Adams' convictions and
sentences.
DATED this 3rdday of December 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31d day of December 2008 sewed a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~ e ~ t Attorney
l ( t ~ General"

